Dictatorship on top-circular domains

DOI10.1007/s11238-018-9667-7zbMath1417.91191OpenAlexW2755689789MaRDI QIDQ1620949

Souvik Roy, Gopakumar Achuthankutty

Publication date: 15 November 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81368/1/MPRA_paper_81368.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dictatorial domainsmaximal conflict propertytop-circularityweak conflict property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey

Cites Work

• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• Tops-only domains
• Circular domains
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• Dictatorial domains
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
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• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences

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