A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.07.002MaRDI QIDQ2463577zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 14 December 2007

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterhwaiterestricted domainsstrategy-proofnesssuperdictatoriality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
• Dictatorial domains
• Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
• Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case

Cited in

(6)

• Dictatorship on top-circular domains
• Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility
• Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
• Superdictatorial domains for monotonic social choice functions
• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Circular domains

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