A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.07.002zbMath1141.91378OpenAlexW1991855996MaRDI QIDQ2463577

M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 14 December 2007

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessrestricted domainsGibbard-Satterhwaitesuperdictatoriality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Dictatorship on top-circular domains ⋮ Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility ⋮ A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions ⋮ Superdictatorial domains for monotonic social choice functions ⋮ Circular domains

Cites Work

• Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
• Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Dictatorial domains
• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness

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