A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
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Publication:2463577
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.07.002zbMATH Open1141.91378OpenAlexW1991855996MaRDI QIDQ2463577FDOQ2463577
Authors: M. Remzi Sanver 
Publication date: 14 December 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.07.002
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Dictatorial domains
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
- The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case
- Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
- Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
Cited In (6)
- Dictatorship on top-circular domains
- Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Circular domains
- Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
- Superdictatorial domains for monotonic social choice functions
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