Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.11.005MaRDI QIDQ1934066zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Koji Takamiya

Publication date 28 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13938

zbMATH Keywords

coalition strategy-proofnessmaskin monotonicitysocial choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

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• The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
• Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

Cites work

• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On cores and indivisibility
• On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness

Cited in

(15)

• A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
• The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
• Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
• On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
• Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
• Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
• Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
• Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
• Ordinal simplicity in discrete mechanism design
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties

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