Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
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Publication:2386331
Recommendations
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly
- House allocation with transfers
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
- Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679846 (Why is no real title available?)
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- Matching with quorums
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Equilibria in sequential allocation
- Assigning papers to referees
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
- Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
- Efficient priority rules
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
- Allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences
- Consistent house allocation
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- On optimal allocation of indivisibles under uncertainty
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
- Strategyproof single unit award rules
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
- Strategy-proof popular mechanisms
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- Hierarchical allocation
- Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Top trading cycles
- Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity
- The marriage problem with interdependent preferences
- Optimizing over serial dictatorships
- Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities
- Optimizing over serial dictatorships
- Strategy-proof allocation of objects: a characterization result
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
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