Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
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Publication:2386331
DOI10.1007/s003550050160zbMath1066.91571MaRDI QIDQ2386331
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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