Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
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Publication:2386331
DOI10.1007/S003550050160zbMATH Open1066.91571MaRDI QIDQ2386331FDOQ2386331
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
- Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
- Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Consistent house allocation
- Efficient priority rules
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with transfers
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- Matching with quorums
- On optimal allocation of indivisibles under uncertainty
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Strategyproof single unit award rules
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Assigning papers to referees
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Top trading cycles
- Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial Dictatorship
- Random assignments of bundles
- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Characterization of \textit{maxmed} mechanisms for multiple objects
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
- Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
- Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
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