Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
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Publication:1411037
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00091-7zbMath1076.91023WikidataQ56609431 ScholiaQ56609431MaRDI QIDQ1411037
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Tayfun Sönmez
Publication date: 15 October 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (35)
Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms ⋮ Efficient lottery design ⋮ Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? ⋮ Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence ⋮ A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain ⋮ Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems ⋮ Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object ⋮ Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line ⋮ Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results ⋮ An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences ⋮ On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems ⋮ Simultaneous eating algorithm and greedy algorithm in assignment problems ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization ⋮ Assigning agents to a line ⋮ A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem ⋮ Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts ⋮ Popular mixed matchings ⋮ Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences ⋮ Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model ⋮ The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments ⋮ A new solution to the random assignment problem. ⋮ Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects ⋮ Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions ⋮ Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences ⋮ Random assignment under weak preferences ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals ⋮ Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects ⋮ Shortest paths with ordinal weights ⋮ Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure ⋮ Pairwise kidney exchange
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