Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:700121
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0858zbMATH Open1098.91547OpenAlexW1969451165MaRDI QIDQ700121FDOQ700121
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/498716ce771c4bf85832802e2d6037b159e1a052
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On cores and indivisibility
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- House allocation with transfers
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
Cited In (34)
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
- On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
- House allocation with transfers
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods: a comment
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Algorithms and Computation
- Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- House exchange and residential segregation in networks
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
This page was built for publication: Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q700121)
