Matching with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:1729666
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.004zbMath1419.91521OpenAlexW2906482047WikidataQ128706072 ScholiaQ128706072MaRDI QIDQ1729666
Publication date: 28 February 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.004
Related Items (11)
On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options ⋮ Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains ⋮ Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences ⋮ The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets ⋮ Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints ⋮ On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions ⋮ A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling ⋮ When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? ⋮ Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
Cites Work
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
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