Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.006zbMath1519.91140OpenAlexW4328053083MaRDI QIDQ6102576

Yuki Tamura

Publication date: 23 June 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

single-dipped preferencesobvious strategy-proofnessobject reallocation problemsTTC

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

Cites Work

• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• Matching with single-peaked preferences
• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• On cores and indivisibility
• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences

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