Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
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Publication:6102576
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.006zbMath1519.91140OpenAlexW4328053083MaRDI QIDQ6102576
Publication date: 23 June 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.006
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
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