Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
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Publication:403970
DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0396-4zbMATH Open1302.91084OpenAlexW1965412835MaRDI QIDQ403970FDOQ403970
Authors: Vikram Manjunath 
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0396-4
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- On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
- On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
- Voting by Committees
- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
Cited In (28)
- Upper set rules with binary ranges
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
- Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Dictatorship on top-circular domains
- Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents
- Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- Non-bossiness
- Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
- Revealed preference domains from random choice
- Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
- Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
- Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
- Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
- Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
- Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
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