Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
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Publication:403970
DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0396-4zbMath1302.91084OpenAlexW1965412835MaRDI QIDQ403970
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0396-4
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