Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0957-0zbMath1392.91042OpenAlexW2319209857MaRDI QIDQ331702

Diego M. Caramuta, Grisel Ayllón

Publication date: 27 October 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0957-0

zbMATH Keywords

group strategy-proofnesspublic badssingle-dipped preferenceunanimity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains

Cites Work

• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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• Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
• Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Single-plateaued choice
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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