Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0957-0MaRDI QIDQ331702zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Grisel Ayllón, Diego M. Caramuta

Publication date 27 October 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0957-0

zbMATH Keywords

group strategy-proofnesspublic badssingle-dipped preferenceunanimity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
• Single-plateaued choice
• Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(6)

• Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval
• Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
• Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
• Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
• Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains

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