Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
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Publication:331702
DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0957-0zbMATH Open1392.91042OpenAlexW2319209857MaRDI QIDQ331702FDOQ331702
Diego M. Caramuta, Grisel Ayllón
Publication date: 27 October 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0957-0
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
- Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
- Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
- Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Single-plateaued choice
Cited In (5)
- Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
- Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
- Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
- Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
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