Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6113711
DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01438-yzbMath1520.91134MaRDI QIDQ6113711
Publication date: 11 July 2023
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Monotone strategyproofness
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
This page was built for publication: Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis
