Strategy-proofness and ``median voters

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Publication:1376987

DOI10.1007/s001820050047zbMath0888.90006OpenAlexW1992903091MaRDI QIDQ1376987

Stephen Ching

Publication date: 1 February 1998

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177668




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