Strategy-proofness and ``median voters

DOI10.1007/s001820050047zbMath0888.90006MaRDI QIDQ1376987

Stephen Ching

Publication date: 1 February 1998

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177668

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofness; single-peaked preferences; augmented median-voter solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B18: Public goods

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options, Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences, Strategy-proof location on a network, The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences, Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule, Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo

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