Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
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Publication:1376987
DOI10.1007/S001820050047zbMATH Open0888.90006OpenAlexW1992903091MaRDI QIDQ1376987FDOQ1376987
Publication date: 1 February 1998
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177668
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- Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
Cites Work
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Voting under constraints
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces
- Generalized median social welfare functions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (31)
- The capacity constrained facility location problem
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms
- Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
- The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
- Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules
- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
- Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
- A note on uniqueness of electoral equilibrium when the median voter is unobserved
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
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