Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
From MaRDI portal
Publication:894024
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.12.010zbMATH Open1330.91074OpenAlexW2103862640MaRDI QIDQ894024FDOQ894024
Authors: Alexander Reffgen 
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.010
Recommendations
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- The String-to-String Correction Problem
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Tops-only domains
- A linear space algorithm for computing maximal common subsequences
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Voting by Committees
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Circular domains
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
- A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Dictatorial domains
- Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Voting under constraints
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games
Cited In (18)
- Social Choice Theory
- Intradimensional single-peakedness and the multidimensional Arrow problem
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternatives
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness
- Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q894024)
