Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
From MaRDI portal
Publication:894024
Recommendations
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- A linear space algorithm for computing maximal common subsequences
- Circular domains
- Dictatorial domains
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- Social choice and individual values
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- The String-to-String Correction Problem
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Tops-only domains
- Voting by Committees
- Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
- Voting under constraints
Cited in
(20)- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Intradimensional single-peakedness and the multidimensional Arrow problem
- Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
- Social Choice Theory
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternatives
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q894024)
