On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2447057
Recommendations
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
Cites work
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
- Dictatorial domains
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Graphs and Anonymous Social Welfare Functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Tops-only domains
- Voting by Committees
Cited in
(30)- The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
- Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
- Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate
- Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
- Random dictatorship domains
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains
- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
- Condorcet domains satisfying Arrow's single-peakedness
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains
- Tops-only domains
- Domains where the uniform rule is well behaved
- Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation
- Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
- Circular domains
- Monotone strategyproofness
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
This page was built for publication: On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2447057)
