Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel

DOI10.1007/S00355-019-01196-4zbMATH Open1437.91178OpenAlexW2948978524MaRDI QIDQ2179463FDOQ2179463

Authors: Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Salvador Barberà 

Publication date: 12 May 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/1095.pdf

Recommendations

• Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains
• Arrow-inconsistent economic domains
• Domain conditions in social choice theory
• The relationship between Arrow's and Wilson's theorems on restricted domains
• On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremsocial choice functionsdomain conditions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Introduction to judgment aggregation
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Single-peaked orders on a tree
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
• Domain conditions in social choice theory
• Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
• Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
• Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
• Dictatorial domains
• Acyclic sets of linear orders
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
• Acyclic sets of linear orders: a progress report
• A characterization of the single-peaked domain
• Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
• Voting under constraints
• On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
• A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
• Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains
• Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes
• Graphs and Anonymous Social Welfare Functions
• On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
• De jure naturae et gentium: Samuel von Pufendorf's contribution to social choice theory and economics

Cited In (4)

• A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
• Euclidean preferences in the plane under \(\ell_1,\ell_2\) and \(\ell_\infty\) norms
• Structure of single-peaked preferences
• The relationship between Arrow's and Wilson's theorems on restricted domains

This page was built for publication: Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2179463)