Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2179463
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3048439 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Acyclic sets of linear orders
- Acyclic sets of linear orders: a progress report
- Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
- Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
- Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes
- Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- De jure naturae et gentium: Samuel von Pufendorf's contribution to social choice theory and economics
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
- Dictatorial domains
- Domain conditions in social choice theory
- Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Graphs and Anonymous Social Welfare Functions
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Introduction to judgment aggregation
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
- On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
- Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
- Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
- Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
- Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
- Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Voting under constraints
Cited in
(6)- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
- A combinatorial topology approach to Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Euclidean preferences in the plane under \(\ell_1,\ell_2\) and \(\ell_\infty\) norms
- Structure of single-peaked preferences
- The relationship between Arrow's and Wilson's theorems on restricted domains
This page was built for publication: Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2179463)
