Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel

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Cites work

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3048439 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

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A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
Euclidean preferences in the plane under \(\ell_1,\ell_2\) and \(\ell_\infty\) norms
Structure of single-peaked preferences
The relationship between Arrow's and Wilson's theorems on restricted domains

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