On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems

DOI10.1007/S003550200181zbMATH Open1073.91553OpenAlexW2036912882MaRDI QIDQ2568802FDOQ2568802

Authors: Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly 

Publication date: 19 October 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200181

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (18)

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• A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem
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• Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
• The relationship between Arrow's and Wilson's theorems on restricted domains
• Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow's theorem
• Social welfare functions on parametric domains

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