Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
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Publication:2450150
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0564-ZzbMATH Open1287.91058OpenAlexW2062057342MaRDI QIDQ2450150FDOQ2450150
Authors: Susumu Cato 
Publication date: 16 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0564-z
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Cites Work
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Cited In (12)
- Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures
- Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
- Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
- Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
- A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
- Weak independence and the Pareto principle
- The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
- On the difficulty of combining actual and potential criteria for an increase in social welfare
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
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