Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
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Publication:2399674
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.002zbMath1394.91123OpenAlexW2590873684MaRDI QIDQ2399674
Publication date: 24 August 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.002
Related Items (8)
Stable preference aggregation with infinite population ⋮ Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency ⋮ When is weak Pareto equivalent to strong Pareto? ⋮ Quasi-stationary social welfare functions ⋮ Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters ⋮ Superset-robust collective choice rules ⋮ Preference aggregation and atoms in measures ⋮ The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
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