Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.04.003zbMath1236.91065MaRDI QIDQ2427837

Mitsunori Noguchi

Publication date: 18 April 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

filter; ultrafilter; Arrow's impossibility theorem; social welfare function; collective choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures, Quasi-stationary social welfare functions, The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population, Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population

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