Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions

DOI10.2307/2296434zbMATH Open0181.47302OpenAlexW2074436643WikidataQ56171285 ScholiaQ56171285MaRDI QIDQ5573006FDOQ5573006

Authors: Amartya Sen 

Publication date: 1969

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296434

zbMATH Keywords

operations research

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• A hyper-relation characterization of weak pseudo-rationalizability
• Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
• Preferences over rich sets of random variables: on the incompatibility of convexity and semicontinuity in measure
• On some suggestions for having non-binary social choice functions
• Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems
• Plural identities and preference formation
• Arrow's theorem for incomplete relations
• Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
• Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
• Modeling rationality in a linguistic framework
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting
• Properties of goal systems: Consistency, conflict, and coherence
• Revealed preference and the axiomatic foundations of intransitive indifference: The case of asymmetric subrelations
• Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations
• A foundation for Pareto optimality
• A simple voting scheme generates all binary relations on finite sets
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
• Topological connectedness and behavioral assumptions on preferences: a two-way relationship
• Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
• A bi-preference interplay between transitivity and completeness: reformulating and extending Schmeidler's theorem
• Transitivity of fuzzy relations and rational choice
• Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
• Convex geometry and group choice
• Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains
• Weak pseudo-rationalizability
• On an extension of a theorem of Eilenberg and a characterization of topological connectedness
• Completeness and transitivity of preferences on mixture sets
• On the consistency and the decisiveness of the double-minded decision-maker
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
• Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
• Domain closedness conditions and rational choice
• \((m, n)\)-rationalizable choices
• Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
• Choice probabilities and choice functions
• Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
• Chernoff's dual axiom, revealed preference and weak rational choice functions
• Priority classes and weighted constrained equal awards rules for the claims problem
• The rationalizability of two-step choices
• Weak path independence
• Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
• Rationalizability of menu preferences
• Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
• What we know and what to do
• Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Dynamically consistent voting rules
• Geometry of decision making and the vector space formulation of the analytic hierarchy process
• Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
• Expected utility without full transitivity
• Upper semicontinuous extensions of binary relations
• Sequential path independence and social choice
• Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
• A theory of reference-dependent behavior
• Order restricted preferences and majority rule
• Behavioral implications of shortlisting procedures
• Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
• Distances of Fuzzy Choice Functions
• Contraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence
• Satisficing behavior with a secondary criterion
• Comparison and choice
• `Regular' choice and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference
• The impossibility of a weakly path independent Paretian liberal
• A folk meta-theorem in the foundations of utility theory
• A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
• Intertemporal bounded rationality as consideration sets with contraction consistency
• On the consistency of choice
• Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
• Indecisive choice theory
• Fair division with uncertain needs
• Statement of precedence and a comment on IIA terminology
• Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Smallest quasi-transitive extensions
• A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set
• Multiattribute utility theory: A survey
• Characterizing fidelity for reflexive choices
• Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
• Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly
• Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
• Epictetusian rationality
• Reflections on Arrow's research program of social choice theory
• Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
• Vetoing: social, logical and mathematical aspects
• Minimal rationalizations
• Quasi-Transitive Rationality of Fuzzy Choice Functions Through Indicators
• Merging epistemic states and manipulation
• Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency
• Preference exclusions for social rationality
• A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
• Quasi-stationary social welfare functions
• Aggregation of preferences: a review
• Dominance and admissibility without priors
• Congruence relations on a choice space
• Criteria for judging the rationality of decisions in the presence of vague alternatives
• Anonymity in large societies
• Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
• On interrelations between fuzzy congruence axioms
• An introduction to Allan Gibbard's oligarchy theorem paper
• Some algebraic characterizations of preference structures

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