Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions

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Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
The impossibility of a weakly path independent Paretian liberal
A folk meta-theorem in the foundations of utility theory
A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
Quasi-transitive rationality of fuzzy choice functions through indicators
Preference and the cost of preferential choice
Intertemporal bounded rationality as consideration sets with contraction consistency
On the consistency of choice
Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
Indecisive choice theory
On the full rationality of fuzzy choice functions on base domain
On some weakened forms of transitivity in the logic of conditional obligation
Fair division with uncertain needs
Statement of precedence and a comment on IIA terminology
Transitive and acyclic rationality indicators of fuzzy choice functions on base domain
Full Rationality of Fuzzy Choice Functions on Base Domain Through Indicators
Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem
A hyper-relation characterization of weak pseudo-rationalizability
A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set
Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
Smallest quasi-transitive extensions
Preferences over rich sets of random variables: on the incompatibility of convexity and semicontinuity in measure
On some suggestions for having non-binary social choice functions
Multiattribute utility theory: A survey
Characterizing fidelity for reflexive choices
Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems
Statistical foundations of person parameter estimation in the Thurstonian IRT model for forced-choice and pairwise comparison designs
Plural identities and preference formation
Arrow's theorem for incomplete relations
Modeling rationality in a linguistic framework
Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly
Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting
Properties of goal systems: Consistency, conflict, and coherence
Revealed preference and the axiomatic foundations of intransitive indifference: The case of asymmetric subrelations
Between burgess and Lewis. II: Semantics without rational monotonicity
A simple voting scheme generates all binary relations on finite sets
Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations
A foundation for Pareto optimality
Distances of fuzzy choice functions
The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
Topological connectedness and behavioral assumptions on preferences: a two-way relationship
Epictetusian rationality
Reflections on Arrow's research program of social choice theory
Escaping Arrow's theorem: the advantage-standard model
Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
Transitivity of fuzzy relations and rational choice
Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
A bi-preference interplay between transitivity and completeness: reformulating and extending Schmeidler's theorem
Convex geometry and group choice
Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains
Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
Weak pseudo-rationalizability
On an extension of a theorem of Eilenberg and a characterization of topological connectedness
Completeness and transitivity of preferences on mixture sets
On the consistency and the decisiveness of the double-minded decision-maker
Minimal rationalizations
Vetoing: social, logical and mathematical aspects
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
(m, n)-rationalizable choices
Domain closedness conditions and rational choice
Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
Merging epistemic states and manipulation
Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
Choice probabilities and choice functions
A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
Chernoff's dual axiom, revealed preference and weak rational choice functions
Preference exclusions for social rationality
Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency
Priority classes and weighted constrained equal awards rules for the claims problem
The rationalizability of two-step choices
Aggregation of preferences: a review
Quasi-stationary social welfare functions
Weak path independence
Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
Rationalizability of menu preferences
Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
Dominance and admissibility without priors
Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem
Dynamically consistent voting rules
What we know and what to do
Geometry of decision making and the vector space formulation of the analytic hierarchy process
Congruence relations on a choice space
Criteria for judging the rationality of decisions in the presence of vague alternatives
Anonymity in large societies
Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
Expected utility without full transitivity
Upper semicontinuous extensions of binary relations
Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
Sequential path independence and social choice
Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
Order restricted preferences and majority rule
On interrelations between fuzzy congruence axioms

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