Aggregation of preferences: a review
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Publication:1158068
DOI10.1016/0377-2217(82)90004-2zbMath0471.90005OpenAlexW2055211214MaRDI QIDQ1158068
Publication date: 1982
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(82)90004-2
Individual preferences (91B08) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-02) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (4)
Bipolar preference modeling and aggregation in decision support ⋮ Aggregation of partial ordinal ranking: An interval goal programming approach ⋮ Fusion: General concepts and characteristics ⋮ Fusion: General concepts and characteristics
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