An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4178728
DOI10.1287/MOOR.3.4.334zbMATH Open0395.90002OpenAlexW2003554926MaRDI QIDQ4178728FDOQ4178728
Authors: Bernard Monjardet 
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.3.4.334
Cited In (19)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Solving the Kemeny ranking aggregation problem with quantum optimization algorithms
- SOME ORDER DUALITIES IN LOGIC, GAMES AND CHOICES
- Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow's impossibility theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow's dictators?)
- Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains
- The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union
- Faithful consensus methods for n-trees
- Maximal Condorcet domains
- The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Arrowian characterizations of latticial federation consensus functions
- Consensus functions defined on trees
- Majority rule on rhombus tilings and Condorcet super-domains
- Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
- Consensus weak hierarchies
- Stability conditions for consensus functions defined on \(n\)-trees
- Heights of simple games
- The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
- Distance and consensus for preference relations corresponding to ordered partitions
This page was built for publication: An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4178728)
