Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00002-5zbMath1075.91531MaRDI QIDQ1964744

L. A. Sholomov

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Social choice; Aggregation operator; Arrow theorem; Ordinal relation; Normative constraints; Rationality conditions; Social decision rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Properties underlying a preference aggregator based on satisficing logic, On a possible continuous analogue of the Szpilrajn theorem and its strengthening by Dushnik and Miller, Consensus functions on tree quasi-orders that satisfy an independence condition, On the continuous analogue of the Szpilrajn theorem. I, The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union

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