Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
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Publication:1964744
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00002-5zbMath1075.91531MaRDI QIDQ1964744
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Social choiceAggregation operatorArrow theoremOrdinal relationNormative constraintsRationality conditionsSocial decision rules
Related Items (8)
On a possible continuous analogue of the Szpilrajn theorem and its strengthening by Dushnik and Miller ⋮ Conditional extensions of fuzzy preorders ⋮ Consensus functions on tree quasi-orders that satisfy an independence condition ⋮ The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Properties underlying a preference aggregator based on satisficing logic ⋮ Choice Functions on Tree Quasi-Orders ⋮ On the continuous analogue of the Szpilrajn theorem. I
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