Hierarchical voting
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1089231
DOI10.1016/0020-0255(86)90053-8zbMath0618.90006MaRDI QIDQ1089231
Fuad T. Aleskerov, Andrey V. Vladimirov
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Information Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0020-0255(86)90053-8
independence of irrelevant alternatives; voting operators; collective binary relations; individual binary relations
91B14: Social choice
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Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice, Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case, Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions, Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures, Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions., The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union
Cites Work
- Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
- The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
- Local operators in models of social choice
- General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
- Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences
- Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle
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