Hierarchical voting

DOI10.1016/0020-0255(86)90053-8zbMath0618.90006OpenAlexW2911262989MaRDI QIDQ1089231

Andrey V. Vladimirov, Fuad T. Aleskerov

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Information Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0020-0255(86)90053-8

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternativesvoting operatorscollective binary relationsindividual binary relations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures ⋮ Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions ⋮ Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice ⋮ Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice ⋮ Generalized Rawlsianism ⋮ Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions. ⋮ The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case

Cites Work

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