Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions

DOI10.1007/BF01213251zbMATH Open0811.90002OpenAlexW2021548540MaRDI QIDQ1339028FDOQ1339028

Authors: Thomas E. Armstrong 

Publication date: 1 May 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213251

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zbMATH Keywords

comonotonicityprecisely dictatorial social welfare functionsweighted majority ruledictatorial hierarchyrelational monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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Cited In (4)

• Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
• Positional independence in preference aggregation: a remark
• Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
• The equivalent conditions of dictatorship for social welfare functions

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