Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions

DOI10.1007/BF01213251zbMath0811.90002OpenAlexW2021548540MaRDI QIDQ1339028

Thomas E. Armstrong

Publication date: 1 May 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213251

zbMATH Keywords

comonotonicityprecisely dictatorial social welfare functionsweighted majority ruledictatorial hierarchyrelational monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

Cites Work

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