scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3845284
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Publication:3315224
zbMATH Open0532.90008MaRDI QIDQ3315224FDOQ3315224
Authors: Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 1983
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
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social welfare functionsdictatornew proofpivotalityindependence conditionArrow's general possibility theorem
Cited In (22)
- Social Choice Theory
- Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
- An alternative proof of Fishburn's axiomatization of lexicographic preferences
- Existence of a dictatorial subgroup in social choice with independent subgroup utility scales, an alternative proof
- More on independent decisiveness and Arrow's theorem
- Kalai and Muller's possibility theorem: a simplified integer programming version
- Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
- A tight quantitative version of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Proving Arrow's theorem by \texttt{PROLOG}
- Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
- Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
- Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
- Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem
- A projection property and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- A pedagogical proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem
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