Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.02.005MaRDI QIDQ2519484zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken

Publication date 26 January 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.005

zbMATH Keywords

arrovian social choiceone-dimensional continuumsingle-peaked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Intradimensional single-peakedness and the multidimensional Arrow problem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3845284
• Domain conditions in social choice theory
• Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments
• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule

Cites work

• A STUDY ON LINEAR INEQUALITY REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS(<Special Issue>Operations Research for Performance Evaluation)
• Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
• Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Generalized median social welfare functions
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 509232 (Why is no real title available?)
• Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
• Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions
• Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
• Oligarchies in spatial environments
• Social choice and individual values
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• Strategy-proof location on a network
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory

Cited in

(8)

• Intradimensional single-peakedness and the multidimensional Arrow problem
• Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
• Single-basined choice
• Single-plateaued choice
• SINGLE PEAKED FUZZY PREFERENCES IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODELS: DOES BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM HOLD?
• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff
• Oligarchies in spatial environments

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