Single-basined choice
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2452228
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.010zbMath1297.91054MaRDI QIDQ2452228
Walter Bossert, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.010
upper semicontinuity; independence of irrelevant alternatives; weak axiom of revealed preference; choice correspondences; single-basinedness
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- Single-peaked choice
- Semicontinuous extension of a partial order
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
- Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
- On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Choice structures and preference relations
- Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
- Single-plateaued choice
- Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
- The Bargaining Problem
- Revealed Preference Theory
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
