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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194806 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3436873 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3092990 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Choice structures and preference relations
- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
- Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
- Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
- Revealed Preference Theory
- Semicontinuous extension of a partial order
- Single-peaked choice
- Single-plateaued choice
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
- Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
- Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- The bargaining problem
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