Choice on the simplex domain
The authors consider a \(n\)-agent choice problem: there is a surplus of a perfectly divisible good, which has to be divided among n agents with an entitled minimal share. The choice problem is represented by the unit simplex and its subsimplices. Choice rules with 3 properties are analyzed: independence of irrelevant alternatives, continuity (with respect to minimal shares), monotonicity (fairness). The authors give a new proof for these choice rules to be represantable by a real valued function (based on the Lebesgue-measure of choice sets). Other theorems give characterizations of path collections and weak or strong revealed preference relations. Special results are obtained for \(n=3\).
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