On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules
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Publication:4958546
DOI10.1287/moor.2021.1128zbMath1471.91342OpenAlexW3125395114MaRDI QIDQ4958546
Serhat Doğan, Battal Doğan, Kemal Yıldız
Publication date: 14 September 2021
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/77333
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Cites Work
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