Single-plateaued choice
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Publication:2637846
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.01.008zbMath1280.91050OpenAlexW2025307914MaRDI QIDQ2637846
Walter Bossert, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 14 February 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.01.008
independence of irrelevant alternativessingle-peaked preferencescontinuity propertysingle-plateaued preferenceschoice-theoretic setting
Related Items (4)
Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity ⋮ On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Single-basined choice ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
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