Core thresholds of symmetric majority voting games
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Cites work
- A decisiveness index for simple games
- A recursive core for partition function form games
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099364 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
- Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
- Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set
- On the stability of coalition structures
- Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
- Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After
- Single-peaked choice
- Single-plateaued choice
- Stability and values for games with coalition structures
- Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- The farsighted stable set
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
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