Stability and values for games with coalition structures
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Publication:2659989
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.109750zbMATH Open1460.91015OpenAlexW3122894802MaRDI QIDQ2659989FDOQ2659989
Authors: Takaaki Abe 
Publication date: 29 March 2021
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109750
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Cites Work
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- On the stability of coalition structures
- Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
- MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
- Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
- THE AUMANN-DRÈZE VALUE, THE WIESE VALUE, AND STABILITY: A NOTE
Cited In (12)
- Coalition structure value considering the outside alignment option of priori coalition
- Training, abilities and the structure of teams
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
- Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures
- A coalitional power value for set games
- On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)
- A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires
- A consensus value for games with coalition structure
- A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions
- Coalitional stability conditions in multicriteria dynamic games
- The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
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