On the structural stability of values for cooperative games

DOI10.1007/S10957-021-01863-6MaRDI QIDQ2046545zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xianghui Li, Yang Li

Publication date 18 August 2021

Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-021-01863-6

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationlevel structurestabilitystrong equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• From hierarchies to levels: new solutions for games with hierarchical structure
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• THE AUMANN-DRÈZE VALUE, THE WIESE VALUE, AND STABILITY: A NOTE
• The degree value for games with communication structure
• The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints

Cited in

(13)

• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
• An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
• Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• Stability and values for games with coalition structures
• Owen-stable coalition partitions in games with vector payoffs
• Coalition structure stability in a model of bank cooperation
• Stability conditions for a special class of cooperative games with level structure
• Owen-stable coalition partitions in games with vector payoffs
• Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games
• Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
• Stabilization of the Shapley value for cooperative games through level-induced structures

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