Graphs and Cooperation in Games

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2.3.225zbMATH Open0402.90106OpenAlexW1975617599WikidataQ56701506 ScholiaQ56701506MaRDI QIDQ4187625FDOQ4187625

Authors: Roger B. Myerson 

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/246.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueapplication of graph theorycooperation structuresgames in characteristic function form\(n\)-person cooperative gamefair allocation rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games involving graphs (91A43) Graph theory (05C99)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• Graph sharing games: complexity and connectivity
• The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees
• Coordination games on graphs
• The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games
• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• Outside options in probabilistic coalition situations
• A discrete Choquet integral for ordered systems
• Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Contractually stable networks
• Games with fuzzy authorization structure: a Shapley value
• Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation
• Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems
• WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE
• The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
• An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players
• Potentials in cooperative TU-games
• The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
• Tree, web and average web values for cycle-free directed graph games
• The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree
• RESTRICTED COALITIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS
• Fair allocation in networks with externalities
• Parameterized fairness axioms on cycle-free graph games
• Flexible network rules for identified externalities
• A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• On the convexity of communication games
• Cooperation indices and coalitional value
• Inequality and network structure
• An algorithm for computing the nucleolus of disjunctive non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure
• Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation
• Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
• The prenucleolus for games with restricted cooperation
• A coalitional control scheme with applications to cooperative game theory
• The Myerson value for complete coalition structures
• Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
• Bargaining and membership
• Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options
• Games induced by the partitioning of a graph
• Digraph competitions and cooperative games
• Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
• An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure
• Allocation rules for coalitional network games
• Coalitional stochastic stability
• The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
• An axiomatization of probabilistic Owen value for games with coalition structure
• On non-transferable utility games with coalition structure
• Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation
• A matrix approach to TU games with coalition and communication structures
• A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• Network potentials
• Pyramidal values
• Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
• Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games
• Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
• Outside option values for network games
• Discounted tree solutions
• Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games
• Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games
• Centrality and power in social networks: A game theoretic approach.
• LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
• Networks and outside options
• Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
• Comments on: ``Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
• Axiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values for games with a permission structure
• On stability of economic networks
• Communication in markets. A suggested approach
• A simple family of solutions for forest games
• Semivalues as power indices.
• Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends
• The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
• Coalitional bargaining in networks
• A note on a consistency property for permutations
• Adaptive allocation rules for hypergraph games
• Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure
• Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
• Complexity and stochastic evolution of dyadic networks
• Information-sharing in social networks
• Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures
• The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures
• Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations
• Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies
• A core-allocation for a network restricted linear production game
• Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
• Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
• A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
• Difference between the position value and the myerson value is due to the existence of coalition structures
• Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games
• A Banzhaf value for games with fuzzy communication structure: computing the power of the political groups in the European parliament
• Values on regular games under Kirchhoff's laws
• Conference structures and consistency
• Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel
• A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Communication and cooperation in public network situations
• Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
• Generalized minimum spanning tree games
• The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints

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