Graphs and Cooperation in Games
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Publication:4187625
DOI10.1287/MOOR.2.3.225zbMATH Open0402.90106OpenAlexW1975617599WikidataQ56701506 ScholiaQ56701506MaRDI QIDQ4187625FDOQ4187625
Authors: Roger B. Myerson 
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/246.pdf
Recommendations
Shapley valueapplication of graph theorycooperation structuresgames in characteristic function form\(n\)-person cooperative gamefair allocation rules
Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games involving graphs (91A43) Graph theory (05C99)
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
- Complexity and stochastic evolution of dyadic networks
- Information-sharing in social networks
- Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures
- The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures
- Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations
- Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies
- A core-allocation for a network restricted linear production game
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
- Difference between the position value and the myerson value is due to the existence of coalition structures
- Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games
- A Banzhaf value for games with fuzzy communication structure: computing the power of the political groups in the European parliament
- Values on regular games under Kirchhoff's laws
- Conference structures and consistency
- Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel
- A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Communication and cooperation in public network situations
- Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
- Generalized minimum spanning tree games
- The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
- Weighted component fairness for forest games
- Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players
- Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners' dilemma games
- A value with incomplete communication
- Games on fuzzy communication structures with Choquet players
- Stable networks
- The Shapley value for shortest path games: a non-graph-based approach
- The core of games on convex geometries
- Cooperative games on antimatroids
- A Shapley value representation of potential games
- Hierarchical organization structures and constraints on coalition formation
- Axiomatization of the Shapley value on minimum cost spanning tree games
- Consistent restricted Shapley values
- Transversality of the Shapley value
- An axiomatization of the disjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure
- A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions
- Values of games with weighted graphs
- A hybrid exact algorithm for complete set partitioning
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for games on augmenting systems
- Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
- Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks
- The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
- Efficient algorithms for game-theoretic betweenness centrality
- Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core
- Multicameral voting cohesion games
- A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures
- Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
- Characterizing the Shapley value in fixed-route traveling salesman problems with appointments
- Stable network topologies using the notion of covering
- Axioms for the Shapley value on convex geometries
- Power measures and solutions for games under precedence constraints
- Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
- Characterization of the core in games with restricted cooperation
- A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games
- Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
- A linear proportional effort allocation rule
- Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players
- The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- Allocation rules for network games
- Farsighted network formation
- A consensus model of political decision-making
- Values of games with probabilistic graphs
- Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation
- Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
- Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value
- A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
- An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games
- Potential maximizers and network formation
- Values for games with two-level communication structures
- An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations
- A value for generalized probabilistic communication situations
- A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures
- Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games
- Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
- A unified approach to the myerson value and the position value
- Values of Graph-Restricted Games
- Cooperation when some players are incompatible
- Identifying stable network structures and sets of key players using a \(W\)-covering perspective
- A polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure
- A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation
- The covering values for acyclic digraph games
- The efficient proportional Myerson values
- Values for interior operator games
- The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy
- Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
- Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
- On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games
- Interaction indices for games on combinatorial structures with forbidden coalitions
- Coalition formation and potential games
- The two-step average tree value for graph and hypergraph games
- A note on a value with incomplete communication
- Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games
- \(\Gamma\)-component additive games
- The effects of excluding coalitions
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