Graphs and Cooperation in Games

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2.3.225zbMATH Open0402.90106OpenAlexW1975617599WikidataQ56701506 ScholiaQ56701506MaRDI QIDQ4187625FDOQ4187625

Authors: Roger B. Myerson 

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/246.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueapplication of graph theorycooperation structuresgames in characteristic function form\(n\)-person cooperative gamefair allocation rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games involving graphs (91A43) Graph theory (05C99)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• A polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure
• A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation
• The covering values for acyclic digraph games
• The efficient proportional Myerson values
• Values for interior operator games
• The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy
• Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
• Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
• On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games
• Interaction indices for games on combinatorial structures with forbidden coalitions
• Coalition formation and potential games
• The two-step average tree value for graph and hypergraph games
• A note on a value with incomplete communication
• Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games
• \(\Gamma\)-component additive games
• The effects of excluding coalitions
• Balanced externalities and the Shapley value
• Strong equilibria in the vehicle routing game
• An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
• Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
• Cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure
• Power indices for political and financial decision making: A review
• Cooperative games with restricted formation of coalitions
• Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: nonmonotonicity of the core
• Fair Attribution of Functional Contribution in Artificial and Biological Networks
• The average tree value for hypergraph games
• Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
• Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures
• On hierarchies and communication
• Indices of criticality in simple games
• The average covering tree value for directed graph games
• Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value
• Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure
• Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems
• Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations
• The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense
• An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
• Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks
• Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value
• The Shapley value for directed graph games
• Network design in games with spillovers
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The center value: a sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs
• THE MARGINAL OPERATORS FOR GAMES ON CONVEX GEOMETRIES
• Modeling cooperation on a class of distribution problems
• Algebraic structure of games
• Graph monotonic values
• A probabilistic position value
• Solution concepts for games with general coalitional structure
• Value of games with two-layered hypergraphs
• Values of games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions
• Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
• Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
• Mathematical definitions of enclave and exclave, and applications
• A coalitional value for games on convex geometries with a coalition structure
• The Shapley value on convex geometries
• Simple games on closure spaces
• Open problems in veto theory
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
• Axiomatizations of two types of Shapley values for games on union closed systems
• Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
• Complexity and stochastic evolution of dyadic networks
• Information-sharing in social networks
• Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures
• The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures
• Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations
• Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies
• A core-allocation for a network restricted linear production game
• Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
• Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
• A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
• Difference between the position value and the myerson value is due to the existence of coalition structures
• Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games
• A Banzhaf value for games with fuzzy communication structure: computing the power of the political groups in the European parliament
• Values on regular games under Kirchhoff's laws
• Conference structures and consistency
• Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel
• A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Communication and cooperation in public network situations
• Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
• Generalized minimum spanning tree games
• The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
• Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
• The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
• Weighted component fairness for forest games
• Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players
• Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners' dilemma games
• A value with incomplete communication
• Games on fuzzy communication structures with Choquet players
• Stable networks
• The Shapley value for shortest path games: a non-graph-based approach
• The core of games on convex geometries
• Cooperative games on antimatroids
• A Shapley value representation of potential games
• Hierarchical organization structures and constraints on coalition formation
• Axiomatization of the Shapley value on minimum cost spanning tree games
• Consistent restricted Shapley values
• Transversality of the Shapley value

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