THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY
DOI10.1142/S0219198913400161zbMath1304.91144OpenAlexW1986539276MaRDI QIDQ2852566
Amandine Ghintran, Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila
Publication date: 9 October 2013
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913400161
Cooperative games (91A12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (7)
Cites Work
- Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
- Trading water along a river
- The covering values for acyclic digraph games
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- The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- Cores of convex games
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
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