Sharing a river among satiable agents
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Publication:952762
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.005zbMath1152.91613WikidataQ59663893 ScholiaQ59663893MaRDI QIDQ952762
Publication date: 14 November 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.005
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
91B18: Public goods
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
Related Items
Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems, Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems, Allocation rules on networks, Trading water along a river, Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities, Sharing a river among satiable agents, Fair intergenerational sharing of a natural resource, Sharing sequential values in a network, Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure, Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule, Composition properties in the river claims problem, THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND COOPERATION IN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER SHARING: AN APPLICATION OF STOCHASTIC STACKELBERG DIFFERENTIAL GAMES IN VOLTA RIVER BASIN, TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: CAN ISSUE LINKAGE HELP MITIGATE EXTERNALITIES?
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- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
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