Sharing a river among satiable agents
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Publication:952762
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.005zbMath1152.91613OpenAlexW2042554865WikidataQ59663893 ScholiaQ59663893MaRDI QIDQ952762
Publication date: 14 November 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.005
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
- Fair allocation in networks with externalities
- Sharing a river among satiable agents
- Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Sharing a river.
- Sharing a polluted river
- Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
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