Trading water along a river

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.11.003MaRDI QIDQ633349zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuntong Wang

Publication date 31 March 2011

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.11.003

zbMATH Keywords

coreefficient allocation of waterwater trading

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Welfare economics (91B15) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Sharing a river.
• Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems
• The river sharing problem with incomplete information
• The river sharing problem: a survey
• Sharing a river among satiable agents

Cites work

• Cores of convex games
• Markets for water rights under environmental constraints
• Sharing a resource with concave benefits
• Sharing a river among satiable agents
• Sharing a river.
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain

Cited in

(19)

• Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure
• Sharing a river.
• The welfare implications of transboundary storage and dam ownership on river water trade
• Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility
• A bargaining model for sharing water in a river with negative externality
• Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule
• The seawall bargaining game
• Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions
• The river sharing problem with incomplete information
• The river sharing problem: a survey
• COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
• Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems
• Time-Consistent Fair Water Sharing Agreements
• Markets for water rights under environmental constraints
• Collective decision making in an international river pollution model
• Market networks: the core
• Sharing the cost of the polluted river: a class of bilateral compensation methods
• The pipeline externalities problem
• The equal share proportional solution for the river sharing problem

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