Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0771-XMaRDI QIDQ483542zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors René van den Brink, Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Gerard van der Laan, Nigel Moes

Publication date 17 December 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0771-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• The river sharing problem: a survey
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Cites work

• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• Evaluating cooperative game theory in water resources
• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
• Sharing a river among satiable agents
• Sharing a river.
• Trading water along a river
• Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river

Cited in

(10)

• Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure
• Sharing a river.
• The welfare implications of transboundary storage and dam ownership on river water trade
• A solution for the flood cost sharing problem
• Composition properties in the river claims problem
• The river sharing problem with incomplete information
• The river sharing problem: a survey
• COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
• Trading water along a river
• Collective decision making in an international river pollution model

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