Composition properties in the river claims problem

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0862-3MaRDI QIDQ2348751zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Erik Ansink, Hans-Peter Weikard

Publication date 15 June 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/a7d49287-cbad-4242-9924-11adec0999d0

zbMATH Keywords

sharing rulewater allocationcomposition axiomsharmon doctrineriver claims problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
• Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems
• The river sharing problem: a survey
• Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity
• Sharing a river.

Cites work

• A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims
• A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• Allocation rules on networks
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• Distributive justice in taxation
• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Evaluating cooperative game theory in water resources
• Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems
• Individual rights and collective responsibility: The rights-egalitarian solution
• Networks of common property resources
• On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation
• Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods
• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
• Sharing a river among satiable agents
• Sharing a river.
• The proportional solution for rights problems
• The river sharing problem: a survey
• The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations
• Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river

Cited in

(5)

• Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility
• On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements
• Sequential bankruptcy problems
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
• Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels

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