COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT

DOI10.1142/S0219198908001935zbMath1157.91337MaRDI QIDQ3618900

Harold Houba

Publication date: 3 April 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001935

zbMATH Keywords

computation; non-transferable utility; property rights; alternating offers; second welfare theorem; walrasian equilibrium; bilateral river basin management; water price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B74: Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.)

Related Items

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems, The welfare implications of transboundary storage and dam ownership on river water trade, The seawall bargaining game, Composition properties in the river claims problem, DOES GAME THEORY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN POLICY MAKING IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT?

Cites Work

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• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model