Networks of common property resources

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0520-7zbMath1213.91039MaRDI QIDQ535168

Rahmi İlkılıç

Publication date: 11 May 2011

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0520-7

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency; networks; Nash equilibrium; centrality measures; commons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

Related Items

Allocation rules on networks, On the private provision of public goods on networks, The cost of segregation in (social) networks, Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods, Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in network games with additive preferences, Composition properties in the river claims problem

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