Sharing a polluted river
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Publication:2384436
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.001zbMath1155.91449WikidataQ59663901 ScholiaQ59663901MaRDI QIDQ2384436
Publication date: 21 September 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.001
91A12: Cooperative games
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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