Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule
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DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.008zbMath1318.91129OpenAlexW1963840451WikidataQ59663902 ScholiaQ59663902MaRDI QIDQ2343390
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, María Gómez-Rúa, Elena Molis
Publication date: 5 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2454/18603
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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- THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY
- CLEANING A RIVER: AN ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY JOINT ACTION
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
