Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01439-xzbMath1520.91276MaRDI QIDQ6116313

Wen-Zhong Li, Gen-Jiu Xu, René van den Brink

Publication date: 11 August 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Design of water quality policies based on proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims ⋮ Cost allocation in energy distribution networks

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