Sharing a river with downstream externalities
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Publication:2184005
DOI10.3390/g10020023zbMath1443.91230OpenAlexW2281447362WikidataQ127877039 ScholiaQ127877039MaRDI QIDQ2184005
Ralph Winkler, Sarina Steinmann
Publication date: 27 May 2020
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020023
river pollutiondownstream externalitiesdownstream incremental distributionoptimal emission abatement
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
- Sharing a river among satiable agents
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Sharing a river.
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- Cores of convex games
- CLEANING A RIVER: AN ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY JOINT ACTION
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
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