Cleaning a river: an analysis of voluntary joint action

DOI10.1111/J.1939-7445.2010.00074.XMaRDI QIDQ3060269zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Michael F. Gengenbach, Hans-Peter Weikard, Erik Ansink

Publication date 1 December 2010

Published in Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.2010.00074.x

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationwastewater treatmenttransboundary pollutionpartition function approachriver-basin management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Sharing a polluted river

Cited in

(7)

• Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule
• Collective decision making in an international river pollution model
• A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities
• Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility
• Sharing a river with downstream externalities
• Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the demand for water quality
• Sharing the cost of the polluted river: a class of bilateral compensation methods

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