Collective decision making in an international river pollution model

DOI10.1111/NRM.12091MaRDI QIDQ6550464zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gerard van der Laan, Nigel Moes

Publication date 5 June 2024

Published in Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

pollutionvalueexternalityinternational riverwater law principles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1090983 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• Cleaning a river: an analysis of voluntary joint action
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems
• Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
• Sharing a polluted river
• Sharing a river among satiable agents
• Sharing a river.
• The Nash rationing problem
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
• Trading water along a river
• Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies
• Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
• `Optimal' pollution abatement--whose benefits matter, and how much?

Cited in

(1)

• A political economy model of the Ganges pollution cleanup problem

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