Collective decision making in an international river pollution model
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Publication:6550464
DOI10.1111/NRM.12091zbMATH Open1542.9129MaRDI QIDQ6550464FDOQ6550464
Authors: Gerard van der Laan, Nigel Moes
Publication date: 5 June 2024
Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
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