Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0525-yzbMath1244.91069OpenAlexW2122601620MaRDI QIDQ431811

Erik Ansink, Hans-Peter Weikard

Publication date: 3 July 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0525-y

zbMATH Keywords

resource redistributionriver sharing problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items

Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games ⋮ Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure ⋮ Sharing a river with downstream externalities ⋮ Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems ⋮ Allocation rules on networks ⋮ Discounted tree solutions ⋮ Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility ⋮ Sequential bankruptcy problems ⋮ On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements ⋮ THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY ⋮ Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update ⋮ Composition properties in the river claims problem

Cites Work

• Sequential share bargaining
• Flow sharing and bankruptcy games
• Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
• New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule
• Sharing a river among satiable agents
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• On fair compensation
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• Sharing a river.
• The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems.
• The proportional rule for problems with constraints and claims.
• Redistribution and compensation
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
• On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
• Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods