Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river

DOI10.1007/S11238-009-9141-7zbMATH Open1232.91030OpenAlexW2165207507WikidataQ59663903 ScholiaQ59663903MaRDI QIDQ708937FDOQ708937

Authors: Anna B. Khmelnitskaya 

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9141-7

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zbMATH Keywords

TU gameMyerson valuecomponent efficiencycooperation structuredeletion link propertyHarsanyi dividendssharing a river

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• Sharing a river.
• On the formation of unions in \(n\)-person games

Cited In (21)

• The river sharing problem: a survey
• Game theoretic foundations of the gately power measure for directed networks
• The covering values for acyclic digraph games
• The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games
• Responsibility and sharing the cost of cleaning a polluted river
• Tree, web and average web values for cycle-free directed graph games
• Generalized Nash equilibrium models for asymmetric, non-cooperative games on line graphs: application to water resource systems
• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
• The \(\eta\)-value of cooperative games restricted by graphs
• Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility
• Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
• Composition properties in the river claims problem
• The average covering tree value for directed graph games
• Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure
• The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations
• Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule
• Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems
• Values for games with two-level communication structures
• Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games
• Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure
• Collective decision making in an international river pollution model

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