Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
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Publication:708937
DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9141-7zbMath1232.91030OpenAlexW2165207507WikidataQ59663903 ScholiaQ59663903MaRDI QIDQ708937
Publication date: 15 October 2010
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9141-7
TU gameMyerson valuecomponent efficiencycooperation structuredeletion link propertyHarsanyi dividendssharing a river
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