Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river

DOI10.1007/S11238-009-9141-7MaRDI QIDQ708937zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

Publication date 15 October 2010

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9141-7

zbMATH Keywords

TU gameMyerson valuecomponent efficiencycooperation structuredeletion link propertyHarsanyi dividendssharing a river

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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• Tree, web and average web values for cycle-free directed graph games
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138565 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078999 (Why is no real title available?)
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• On the formation of unions in \(n\)-person games
• Sharing a river.
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games

Cited in

(21)

• The river sharing problem: a survey
• The covering values for acyclic digraph games
• Game theoretic foundations of the gately power measure for directed networks
• The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games
• Responsibility and sharing the cost of cleaning a polluted river
• Tree, web and average web values for cycle-free directed graph games
• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
• Generalized Nash equilibrium models for asymmetric, non-cooperative games on line graphs: application to water resource systems
• Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility
• The \(\eta\)-value of cooperative games restricted by graphs
• Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
• Composition properties in the river claims problem
• The average covering tree value for directed graph games
• Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure
• The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations
• Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule
• Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems
• Values for games with two-level communication structures
• Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games
• Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure
• Collective decision making in an international river pollution model

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